Random oracle model is a general security analysis tool for rigorous security proof and effective cryptographic protocol design. In the quantum world, the attempts of constructing a quantum random oracle (QRO) have been made, such as quantum-accessible random oracle for post-quantum cryptography and quantum random oracle for quantum digital signature. As in the classical circumstance, it is crucial and challenging to design and instantiate the QRO model with an appropriate quantum hash function. In this work, we construct a QRO model for quantum public-key encryption against key-collision attack, due to the near-orthogonality property of the QRO. To explore a feasible instantiation procedure in the quantum setting, we distinctively give two instantiation examples of QRO by means of single-qubit rotation and quantum fingerprinting, and compare the numerical results of their performances under the key-collision attack. As a result, we extend the QRO model to the security analysis of quantum public-key encryption beyond quantum digital signature, and immunity from collision-type attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random oracle (RO) model is a powerful tool for analysis of the provable security of cryptographic schemes and protocols. Usually, it models an internal hash function to be a truly random function and responds to queries to this function from all parties including an adversary. The RO model was firstly proposed by Bellare et al. and used to prove the security of full domain hash signature [1] .
In the post-quantum era, the RO model welcomes another development opportunity. The capability of a classical adversary against hash function is lower-bounded by the birthday attack [2] . For a quantum adversary, Grover's algorithm [3] grants it quadratic acceleration on collision finding. This breakthrough causes that some protocols with certain internal hash functions are still secure against classical adversaries, but becomes vulnerable to quantum adversaries. Boneh et al. [4] first pointed this change out by allowing the adversary to query the RO with superposition. Such RO is the first quantum random oracle (QRO), also named The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Bora Onat.
as 'quantum-accessible' random oracle. Follow-up works on post-quantum cryptographic protocols under the QRO model [5] , [6] are proposed. Public-key encryption can be converted into key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) [7] , and KEM with explicit rejection can be constructed in the QRO model [8] . Note that the 'quantum-accessible' random oracle still models a classical hash function, even if it allows superposition queries. So it is worth considering to construct a quantum random oracle modelling a quantum hash function.
Different from famous quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols [9] , a new cryptographic primitive, namely quantum hash function, has been considered by researchers for cryptographic protocols with higher level of security. The quantum hash function maps a classical bit-string to a quantum state. Due to the uncloneablility of unknown quantum states, quantum hash functions were first used to design unforgeable quantum digital signatures [10] and quantum fingerprints [11] . Then quantum public-key encryption (QPKE) schemes also made use of the uncloneablility [12] , [13] , regarding secret keys as the trapdoor information. In 2014, Ablayev and Vasiliev [14] for the first time gave a rigorous definition of quantum hash function.
They subsequently discussed several constructions of quantum hash function [15] . Recent works on quantum hash function include new ways of constructions [16] and its applications [17] . However, there are still some open problems in the field of quantum hash functions. In the previous researches, some of quantum hash functions are given concrete constructions of quantum circuits [11] - [13] , [15] , while others are only used as a black box [10] . For the existing and future protocols which use quantum hash functions as secure subprograms (and do not care about how exactly they are instantiated), we do lack an ideal model of such quantum hash function for further analysis and design.
Previous security analyses of quantum cryptographic protocols mainly concentrate on scenario quantum attacks, i.e., only limited types of attack are analyzed [12] , [13] . Such analysis of diverse quantum attacks is not general enough to prove the security of quantum cryptographic protocols, and a more precise and generic tool is needed for the protocols using quantum hash functions to perform provable security analysis. A new type of QRO which can model a quantum hash function is such an efficient tool to solve these problems. A well-defined QRO can reasonably simulate a quantum hash function in term of protocol designing. The attempt of constructing a QRO model has been made in [18] for cryptanalysis of quantum digital signature (QDS).
In this work, we generalize the construction and property of the QRO model, and redefine the QRO model to analyze the security of quantum-hash based QPKE against key-collision attack. Concretely, we design a paradigm of security analysis in the QRO model, and give the instantiation method of the QRO model for quantum cryptographic protocols, i.e., how to replace the QRO with an appropriate quantum hash function.
The main contributions of our work are: 1) A new quantum random oracle model is defined to prove the security of quantum cryptographic protocols. We redefine the QRO so that it can simulate cryptographic procedures of QPKE. We describe the QPKE protocol in the QRO model by defining the adversarychallenger game with the random oracle. Consequently, a paradigm of security proof for QPKE is given in the QRO model. In the security proof for QPKE, we define a collision-type attack, namely key-collision attack, and explain how the near-orthogonality of the QRO immunizes the QPKE protocol from this type of attack. 2) A valid instantiation of quantum random oracle model is given with security proofs. By means of two instantiation examples, we demonstrate that the case of single-qubit rotation is a bad attempt because of the non-orthogonality of public keys, while the case of quantum fingerprinting is a secure quantum hash function and thus valid for QRO instantiation. By numerical simulation, we point out that the near-orthogonality property of QRO must be satisfied in the instantiation to prevent from key-collision attack. This paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we introduce related works including QRO, QPKE and quantum hash function. Section III focuses on the security analysis of QPKE in the QRO model. Then we give a detailed introduction to the instantiation of QRO in Section IV. Section V is our conclusion.
II. RELATED WORKS A. QUANTUM RANDOM ORACLE
Different from the quantum-accessible random oracle model designed for post-quantum cryptography [4] , a quantum random oracle model for quantum digital signature was defined by Shang et. al. [18] . In this QRO model, all parties including an adversary can query a classical random number generator for classical random bits, a quantum random oracle for random qubits and a measurement device for the comparison result of quantum states. The QRO model is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Quantum Random Oracle): A quantum random oracle is defined as an efficient triple algorithm (G, H q , Measure), where:
G: G is a truly random generator. For a classical input m of any size, it outputs a random bit-string
H q : H q is a quantum oracle producing random qubits. For any classical input k ∈ {0, 1} n , it outputs an s-qubit random state
Measure: Measurement is a comparing oracle. For any quantum input pair (|H q (k i ) , |H q (k j ) ) generated by the QRO, it decides whether they are identical.
The QRO described above consists of three parts. The generator G implements a random function to generate a random number. This part of the oracle simulates key-generation and some randomization in a protocol. The quantum random function H q transforms a classical input string to a quantum state, and it is irreversible because it is truly random. The decision part Measure gives the comparison result of two quantum states as a single bit 0 or 1 to users.
Although the oracle was described as an ideal quantum one-way function, it requires more than one-wayness, i.e., it also requires that the outputs are distinguishable. In this sense, it is more reasonable to treat this model as an ideal quantum hash function.
B. QUANTUM HASH FUNCTION
Unlike classical cases where the security analysis relies on computational assumption, the security of quantum hash functions is guaranteed by quantum physical laws. A quantum hash function takes a classical bit-string as an input and outputs a quantum state of fixed length. It also has its one-wayness and collision-resistance. Similar to the classical case, the one-wayness of a quantum hash function requires that the input of a classical bit-string cannot be deduced from the output of quantum states [14] , [15] . The no-cloning theorem avoids an adversary obtaining a large enough number of an unknown hash value. Thus, the one-wayness can be guaranteed by Holevo bound [19] , i.e., no more than O(s) bits of information can be learned from s qubits. According to the Holevo bound, the one-wayness condition holds when the length of an input is much larger than that of an output.
As for collision-resistance, a quantum hash function becomes more complicated and very different from its classical counterpart. Since the Hilbert space is an infinite field (while a set of bit strings with fixed length is a finite one), we can easily design a quantum hash function that is mathematically an injective function, i.e., there is no collision according to its definition. However, when comparing two quantum states or recovering classical information from a quantum state, one will introduce measurement operations, which could lead to collision-type errors. Now the 'collision' refers to the case where quantum hash values are measured to be identical while they are actually different. The probability of this collision is closely related to the inner product of two quantum states. Thus, for the collision-resistance condition, the outputs of a quantum hash function are required to be nearly orthogonal [14] , [15] .
Based on the above considerations, the quantum hash function is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Quantum Hash Function [15] ): Let > 0 and δ > 0. We call the function ψ : {0, 1} n → (H 2 ) ⊗s a ( , δ)-quantum hash function if the following conditions hold:
· One-wayness: for any quantum algorithm A, the probability of finding a preimage of ψ is bounded by :
· Collision resistance: for any different pair (w, w ), the norm of the inner product of their hash value is bounded by √ δ, then the probability that two different hash values are measured to be identical is bounded by:
QPKE protocols can be qubit-rotations-based [12] , [13] , knapsack-based [20] or fully-flipped-permutations-based [21] . Some of them [12] , [13] , [21] can be abstracted as ones that bases on a quantum hash function in which the secret key and the plaintext are classical, while the public key and the ciphertext are quantum states. This type of QPKE can be described as follows.
Definition 3: The QPKE protocol based on a quantum hash function ψ consists of 3 steps:
· Key-generation Gen: the key-generation Gen outputs the secret key sk ∈ {0, 1} n , then generates s-qubit public key |pk by using the quantum hash function ψ:
· Encryption Enc: for the plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}, Enc probabilistically encrypts m with the public key |pk and outputs s-qubit ciphertext |c :
· Decryption Dec: for the ciphertext |c ∈ (H 2 ) ⊗s , Dec deterministically decrypts |c with the secret key sk .
Since the Dec is a quantum algorithm, we introduce a tracing-out operator of the Dec's output to get 1-bit plaintext m :
then the measurement on the base vector {|0 , |1 } can output a classical m . The quantum algorithms Enc and Dec are designed based on the quantum hash function ψ, obeying the following rules:
· Enc and ψ are commute, i. e.,
· When the public key |pk = |0 ⊗s , the last qubit of the output of Enc becomes the base vector:
· Dec reverses ψ:
These three rules guarantee that decryption with the correct sk outputs the original m:
Note that the probabilistic encryption algorithm Enc can be the one that randomly parity-codes the plaintext m then encrypts the codeword. This strategy was suggested against forward-search attack in [13] .
The security notions defined in [22] can help with the cryptanalysis of the QPKE protocols. In the quantum chosen plaintext attack (qCPA) model, (constant) C copies of the public key are fed to the adversary, so it can invoke the encryption oracle with |pk for at most C times. The security under qCPA is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Indistinguishability Under qCPA): A QPKE protocol is indistinguishable [22] under qCPA, if for any quantum adversary A, for every plaintext pair (m x , m y ), the following difference of probability
is negligible.
III. QPKE IN THE QRO MODEL
In this section, we analyze the security of QPKE in the QRO model. We firstly define the QRO so that it can simulate cryptographic procedures of QPKE. Then we describe the QPKE protocol in the QRO model by defining the adversarychallenger game with the random oracle. Finally, we give a paradigm of security proof for QPKE in the QRO model. Herein, we present a new type of attack, namely key-collision attack. Analysis demonstrates that the property of QRO must be satisfied to prevent from this attack.
A. RE-DEFINITION OF THE QRO MODEL
We make reasonable adjustments to the first 'classicalquantum' random oracle in Definition 1. Firstly, we remove the classical random number generator G in Definition 1. This part of QRO simulates the secret key generation step in a protocol, but the input of a message m is unnecessary. In fact, the secret key is generated locally in the QPKE or the QDS protocols, and this step will not be explored in any classical or quantum communication. Removing G does not violate the security proof in [18] . We mainly focus on possible attacks to quantum hash functions. So the classical random number generator G is removed in our QRO model. Then we remove the decision part Measure in Definition 1 and describe the distinguishability as the property of QRO instead. The expression is identical in security proof, while the re-description of the distinguishability is more natural and simplifies the QRO model.
Finally, we add a C-restriction of the QRO, i.e., if the QRO is invoked by the challenger, it only generates at most C copies of the output. This restriction reflects the fact that the adversary can only intercept limited copies of the unknown public key due to the no-cloning theorem.
According to the above considerations, we re-define the QRO as follows.
Definition 5 (Quantum Random Oracle): A quantum random oracle is an efficient algorithm H q that satisfies the following properties:
• When queried with a classical bit-string k ∈ {0, 1} n , H q randomly and consistently generates s-qubit quantum states |H q (k) ∈ (H 2 ) ⊗s .
• Any pair of outputs of H q with different inputs is nearly orthogonal:
where δ is negligible in n.
• If H q is invoked by the challenger with any input k, it responds for at most C times for the same input. In next sections, the QRO in Definition 5 will be utilized for security analysis. We denote that the corollaries in [18] still hold in the adjusted QRO model.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE QPKE PROTOCOL
Here we present the QPKE protocol in the QRO model defined in Definition 5. The adversary-challenger game is defined as follows.
Definition 6 (The Adversary -Challenger Game):
The adversary-challenger game of the QPKE protocol in Definition 3 consists of the following three phases: Phase 1. The Challenger runs Gen(1 n ) to get secret key sk. Then it queries QRO H q with sk. The QRO gives at most C copies of |H q (sk) to the adversary.
Phase 2. The adversary in this phase can query the challenger with message-key pairs (m i , |H q (k i ) ). The challenger encrypts the messages with corresponding public key and returns the ciphertext Enc m i |H q (k i ) to the adversary. The number of this query is denoted by q enc . The adversary can generate arbitrary many of its own public keys by querying QRO. So the public key it supplies to the challenger can be the limited ones it gets in Phase 1, or arbitrary many of its own keys generated in Phase 2. The number of the adversary querying QRO in this phase is denoted by q ro . Obviously, we have q enc ≤ q ro + C. Phase 3. The adversary chooses two distinct plaintexts (m 0 , m 1 ). The challenger encrypts one of them with its public key |H q (sk) and returns Enc m b |H q (sk) , b ∈ {0, 1}. Then the adversary outputs a single bit b ∈ {0, 1}. The advantage of the adversary is denoted by the probability that b = b :
The adversary-challenger game is shown in Fig. 1 . The challenger wins the game if the adversary's advantage is negligible beyond 1 2 . In this case the QPKE protocol has ciphertext indistinguishability under qCPA according to Definition 4.
C. SECURITY OF THE QPKE PROTOCOL
Theorem 1: The QPKE protocol in Definition 3 has ciphertext indistinguishability under qCPA in the QRO model.
Proof. We start with regular analysis as it is in the classical case where the adversary attempts to get a secret key sk. Let A be the event that the adversary asks the query sk in Phase 2 of the game. If A happens, the adversary can decrypt Enc m b |H q (sk) in Phase 3 with probability 1 according to the consistency of Definition 3. But in the game, |H q (sk) is randomly generated by QRO and independent from sk. Thus no public information is related with sk. The probability that the adversary obtains sk is that it asks sk in q ro queries, i. e., the event A happens.
When A does not happen, the adversary faces q enc pieces of ciphertext. Recall that the public keys are generated independently and randomly. The state of the entire possible public keys indicates maximum mixed state:
The ciphertext is generated from the public key by a completely positive map Enc m : The mixed state ρ c stays maximally mixed under the encryption operator, i. e., ρ c = I ⊗s 2 s . Hence, the adversary cannot distinguish from distinct messages.
Based on the above considerations, the advantage of the adversary
Now we consider two special attacks only possible in the quantum world. The first attack is so-called 'forward-search' attack [13] . This type of attack is invalidated by randomization as mentioned in Definition 3.
The second attack is a collision-type attack. Consider a quantum obtaining the key-generation algorithm Gen without the secret key sk. By Randomly guessing secret key, he/she probably gets a wrong public key |H q (sk ) . This wrong public key |H q (sk ) , however, may help the adversary distinguish the ciphertext encrypted with the right key sk in the game due to the probabilistic measurement. This is a collisiontype attack and is called here a key-collision attack. In the quantum-hash-based QPKE, the key-collision attack is possible only when the possible public keys are non-orthogonal.
Definition 7:
A key-collision attack on QPKE helps the adversary distinguish the ciphertext in the game.
An adversary undertakes this attack by randomly guessing sk , generating ciphertext Enc m b |H q (sk ) , and comparing it with the challenge ciphertext Enc m b |H q (sk) .
Theorem 2: If the inner product of two distinct public keys | pk|pk | is negligible, then QPKE in the QRO model is secure under the key-collision attack.
Proof. Note that distinct public keys are near-orthogonal according to Definition 5, i. e., |(H q (k i )|H q (k j ))| = δ where δ is negligible. For comparing technique of SWAPtest [14] , the probability that the adversary can distinguish the challenger's ciphertext with a wrong secret key sk is:
By means of partial-trace and measurement, the adversary can obtain |m with only negligible probability δ 2 . Since the ciphertext can only be decrypted once, the QPKE is secure under the key-collision attack. In the QRO model, the key-collision attack is impossible since the outputs of QRO are nearly orthogonal. When realizing the QRO, corresponding property of quantum hash function must be considered. Detailed discussions about this attack in the instantiation later.
IV. INSTANTIATION OF QRO: A BAD AND A GOOD EXAMPLE
Both in classical and quantum circumstances, the instantiation of the RO model with a concrete hash function is crucial for the practical analysis of cryptographic protocols. In this section, we will discuss what kind of quantum functions is suitable for the instantiation of QRO. We give a qubitrotation-based function and a quantum-fingerprinting-based one as examples. For the former, it is a bad attempt of instantiation because of the non-orthogonality of its outputs. The adversary can decrypt a ciphertext with non-negligible probability even without a secret key. For the latter, it is a ( , δ)-quantum hash function and thus suitable for the instantiation of QRO.
A. A BAD EXAMPLE: SINGLE-QUBIT ROTATION
The QPKE protocol based on single-qubit rotation is presented in [12] , and randomized against forward-search attack in [13] . In this scheme, the QRO is instantiated by a singlequbit rotation around y-axis in the Bloch-sphere, where the rotating angle is determined by the secret key. A probabilistic QPKE protocol based on single-qubit rotation is described as follows.
Scheme 1: The QPKE protocol based on single-qubit rotation [13] consists of three steps:
· Key-generation Gen: Gen chooses a random n-bit string sk = k 1 k 2 . . . k s ∈ {0, 1} n with each k j chosen independently from Z 2 n/s (suppose s divides n). Then Gen prepares s qubits of |0 z ⊗s and performs a rotation operationR(k j ) on each of the jth qubit to obtain ⊗ s j=1 (cos( π k j 2 n/s )|0 + sin( πk j 2 n/s )|1 ). Here the rotation operation R(k j ) = cos π k j 2 n/s |0 + sin
The secret key is sk and the public key is |pk = ⊗ s j=1 (cos( πk j 2 n/s )|0 + sin( πk j 2 n/s )|1 ). · Encryption Enc: for the plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}, Enc probabilistically parity-codes m into s-bit codeword w = w 1 w 2 . . . w s , then Enc encrypts w by rotating jth qubit of the public key with the angle π w j :
· Decryption Dec: for the ciphertext |c , Dec decrypts |c by rotating jth qubit of |c with angle − πk j 2 n/s and gets ⊗ s j=1 (cos(π w j )|0 + sin(π w j )|1 )
then applies CNOT gate where the first s − 1 qubits are the control qubits. Now the last qubit becomes
The measurement on the base vector {|0 , |1 } can output a classical m.
When the QRO is instantiated, the secrecy of sk is guaranteed by Holevo bound. According to the Holevo-Nayak bound [23] , the secret key sk is secure against any adversary when
This scheme is randomized against the forward-search attack. However, it is vulnerable under the key-collision attack. This is because that, as mentioned in section III, the public keys are not 'orthogonal' enough. The inner product of any two possible public key is
and can be non-negligible. In this case, the adversary can decrypt the ciphertext with non-negligible probability
Thus single-qubit rotation is not suitable for instantiating the QRO.
B. A GOOD EXAMPLE: QUANTUM FINGERPRINTING
The quantum fingerprinting technique was used for constructing a quantum hash function [14] . By replacing QRO with this quantum hash function, we can describe the QPKE protocol as follows.
Scheme 2: The QPKE protocol based on quantum fingerprinting [14] consists of three steps:
· Key-generation Gen: Gen fixes a number t. Gen chooses a random n-bit string sk = k 1 k 2 . . . k t ∈ {0, 1} n with each k j chosen independently from Z 2 n/t . Gen also selects dt = 2 s/t−1 t parameters K = {κ 1,1 , . . . , κ d,t } where κ i,j ∈ Z 2 n/t . Then Gen prepares s qubits of |0 z ⊗s and obtains a public key:
|i · (cos( 2π κ i,j k j 2 n/t )|0 + sin( π κ i,j k j 2 n/t )|1 ) (23) The secret key is sk.
· Encryption Enc: for the plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}, Enc probabilistically parity-codes m into t-bit codeword w = w 1 w 2 . . . w t , then Enc encrypts w by rotating js/tth qubit of the public key with the angle πw j :
|i · (cos( 2π κ i,j k j 2 n/t + πw j )|0 + sin( π κ i,j k j · Decryption Dec: for the ciphertext |c , Dec operates the inversion of Gen to obtain
|0 (cos(π w j )|0 + sin(π w j )|1 ) (25) then applies CNOT gate where the first s − 1 qubits are the control qubits. Now the last qubit becomes
The measurement on the base vector {|0 , |1 } can output a classical m. By means of properly choosing the parameter K , this scheme is secure under the key-collision attack. Consider the encryption of one codeword bit w j . The public key for this codeword is
It can be proved that the public keys of any distinct pairs (k j , k j ) are near-orthogonal with properly selected {κ 1,j , κ 2,j , . . . , κ d,j }. In [14] , the proof of following lemma was given. Lemma 1: For a quantum hash function
and arbitrary δ > 0, there exists a set K = {κ i } such that
for any distinct pair of (k, k ). From Lemma 1, we know that public keys of any distinct pairs (k j , k j ) are near-orthogonal with properly selected {κ 1,j , κ 2,j , . . . , κ d,j }. Since the public keys for different codewords are not entangled with each other, the inner product of any two distinct public keys is
Thus the probability that the adversary successfully implements the key-collision attack Pr key−collision attack (adversary) = | pk(k)|pk(k ) | 2 is bounded by δ 2t . According to similar technique in the proof of Theorem 2, the QPKE protocol is secure against the key-collision attack.
C. NUMERICAL SIMULATION OF KEY-COLLISION ATTACK
We give the numerical results of the simulation of the keycollision attack on the aforementioned two examples of the QRO instantiation.
Simulation parameters are set as follows. To make comparison of the two instantiation examples with the same consumption of quantum resource, the length of the public key n in two examples is the same, ranging from 1 qubit to 1000 qubits. Each component of the secret key in both scheme (k i , i = 1, . . . , s in Scheme 1 and k j , j = 1, . . . , t in Scheme 2) is 8 bits. Parameter d in Scheme 2 is d = 8, thus the length of the public key in Scheme 2 is n = (log 2 d + 1)t ⇒ t = n log 2 d+1 = n 4 . Parameters κ i,j ∈ {0, 1} 8 , so 8dt = 16n-bit extra memory for K = {κ i,j , i = 1, . . . , d, j = 1, . . . , k} is required in Scheme 2. To simulate the key-collision attack, we assume that the difference of rotating angle of the correct public key and the attacker's public key is less than θ = π 2 5 . The probability of this attack is no less than 2 θ π = 1 2 6 ≈ 6%, which corresponds to the random guess of the rotating angle of the correct public key. Figure 2 shows the comparison between the adversary's advantage over Scheme 1 and Scheme 2, and Table 1 specifies parameters and results when n = 100. Apparently, while increasing the length of the public key can help reduce the advantage of the adversary, Scheme 1 is vulnerable under the key-collision attack when n = 100. On the other hand, Scheme 2 performs well under the key-collision attack even with a short public key, while it requires extra storage of 1600 bits for K = {κ i,j } when n = 100.
V. CONCLUSION
For the general security analysis of quantum public-key cryptography, we constructed a new quantum random oracle model with reasonable properties. We proved the security of a quantum-hash-based QPKE protocol by modelling this protocol in the random oracle model and analyzing possible quantum attacks. We also demonstrated what kind of instantiation is suitable for the quantum random oracle and verified it by numerical simulation. We note that, while it is natural to conceive secure QPKE schemes under quantum chosen cyphertext attack (qCCA) as in the classical circumstances, how the adversary would deal with the quantum decryption oracle which is probabilistic due to the randomness of measurement is still an open question. Further work lies in security analysis of quantum public-key cryptographic protocols under qCCA, or other kinds of quantum random oracle like 'quantum-to-quantum' random oracle. 
